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ABSTRACT
This paper presents to its readers the progressive legal evolution that has influenced,
over the past century, legal reform in American history. It focuses specifically on
American legal realist thinking that was considered revolutionary in nature relative to
the natural and formalist schools of jurisprudence. The focus then shifts to Egypt
where the combination of formal and natural jurisprudence is clear to legal scholars.
Omar Effendi, as one of the most prominent case decision in the post-25th January
revolution period, was both criticized and lauded for political reasons. Scholars that
supported the decision were glad that the corrupt privatization of a well-known
company ended with the State Council's decision. Opponents feared that the state
courts’ interference in the commercial contractual relationship would negatively
affect investment prospects in Egypt. This paper analyzes the application of law in a
changing political context and concludes with the proof that legal realists strived to
achieve: the implementation and execution of law are pure acts of political choice.
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I.

INTRODUCTION

Since the ruling of the State Court in the Omar Effendi case in Egypt, many legal
debates have emerged that are related to the relation between the court's interpretation
of law and actual political circumstances. One significant question is whether the
court took into consideration the political instability that faced Egypt after the 25th of
January revolution in its ruling in Omar Effendi. And if that is true, then the judges
were indeed politically affected by the external pressures that were present in Egypt at
the time. The judges considered external factors rather than pursuing a strict
application of the law. On this basis, the judges made their decision first before
looking into the facts of the case, then interpreted the legal provisions to serve the
desired outcome. This technique of analyzing a court's decision in the context of
historical, economic and political circumstances is mainly attributed to the legal
realism school of jurisprudence. The insight it provides the rationale for employing
legal realist methodology in the rereading of the Omar Effendi case.
This thesis explores the contributions of legal realism to the evolution of the
American legal system. And when applied to Egyptian legal reform as seen in the
Omar Effendi case, it will prove the claim made by the realists that law is a matter of
political choice rather than a mere application of rigid texts. It does this by analyzing
one of the most prominent cases in Egypt after the 25 January Revolution in 2011, the
Omar Effendi case.1 The selection of Omar Effendi case was made for several
reasons. For instance, it involves a privatization process, a contractual relationship
between the state and private entities, legal due process and justice in its different
manifestations. As a pure claim, the realists were successful in being descriptive
towards those concepts in a legal system. They have sketched the 'real' picture of law.
This paper is a serious effort to use the realists' tools in studying the Omar Effendi
case in its historical and political contexts.
The intervention of policies in law debate has influenced legal scholars generally, and
especially the realists for a long time. The most appealing aspects are the fast
changing policies of American authorities, and the society’s need for a stable legal
system. The realists have always questioned the purity and neutrality of law. The
question is ever-present. The realist approach to political factors that affect the legal
1

Case no. 11492/65/Sate Council, (Administrative and Investment Circuit), (Egypt), (2011).

process and its implementation is beneficial not only for those interested in the
neutrality of law, but also to every citizen who wants to know how the law affects his
or her life. It also reveals flaws in the legal system.
As an instance of progressive legal thoughts' manifestation in the American legal
system, Morton Horwitz argued that the progressive movement that criticized the
decision of Lochner offended the formal jurisprudence school by stating:
The decision of the U.S. Supreme Court in Lochner v. New York
(1905) brought Progressive Legal Thought into being. Lochner, which
struck down a maximum hours law for bakers as an unconstitutional
interference with freedom of contract, galvanized Progressive opinion
and eventually led to a fundamental assault on the legal thought of the
old order.2
Realist jurisprudence took shape out of the criticism leveled at the Lochner decision;
it also raised issues surrounding the concepts of neutrality and justice in law that
influenced theorists and scholars. Realists claimed that legislation and the legal
process of law is biased in a way which reflects the interests of the elites for political
and economic reasons.
In order to understand the concepts of legal realism, it should be placed in its right
historical and political context. Such a context included the reaction to policies that
overwhelmed this period of American history, and gave birth to the invention and
elaboration of legal realism. Realism was intentionally a reaction to classical legal
thought. And as a well based assertion, realism evolved from classical legal thought.
The realists, I believe, were hoping to replace formalist thinking with a pragmatic
approach towards legal thinking. The basis of this attempt was initially to consider
law as human made, not found. Hence, this approach has lead to considering law as
being based on societal ethics, policies and human experience, not the formal logic of
existing rules. Also this leads to the flexibility of altering the laws which are not
consistent with existing ethical concepts or policies. In addition, the rules of law are
not universal, timeless nor logical; they are social systems that were based and
designed by people in different historical and societal contexts to deliver specific

2

Morton J. Horwitz, The Transformation of American Law:1870-1960, The Crisis of Legal Orthodoxy,
Oxford University Press, 1992
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purposes for certain social ends. By realizing these facts, it creates our understanding
of the pragmatic approach towards law. It is a means to use law to our own benefit as
a means, and not an end in itself.
This paper argues that a progressive legal thought approach can be applied to the
Egyptian legal system. And by doing so, it will clarify our understanding of legal
application in practice. This will be achieved by presenting a well-known Egyptian
case – Omar Effendi - which involved many factors and analyzing it using Realist
techniques. Part I of this research explores constructive and destructive aspects of
Realism with respect to the contractual relationship. Part II of this paper explores the
Omar Effendi case and the courts' rationale and demonstrates policy intervention. Part
III recounts the flaws in the court's decision, and shows that the judges made the final
decision then justified it by through the application of legal rules. Finally, the thesis
proposes a legal methodology for analyzing cases which constructs different
perspectives on the State courts' decisions. By applying the new method, it will serve
as a tool for reviewing cases that involve political aspects. This paper aims to
establish new perspectives towards court's decision in the contemporary Egyptian
context. It will synthesize Realists' thoughts on the contractual relationship then a
discussion of how it may help to develop thinking towards the implementation and
execution of law in Egypt.

3

II.

AMERICAN LEGAL REALISM

This chapter introduces an exploration of legal realism in the American legal system.
It starts with a brief discussion of the basis of legal realism, and its origins. It then
questions the basic features of realism; what it is, what realists think, and how it has
contributed to the American legal reform. It concludes with the prominent cases
which engaged legal realists to employ their method of reviewing court decisions.
Hence, this chapter will be discussing realism in the context of the past jurisprudential
schools of natural law and positivism.

A.

Jurisprudence Meaning

Jurisprudence is the science which studies theories of law. The term jurisprudence
itself means the wisdom of law. This wisdom can be studied via two different but
related routes. The first is through the study of the doctrine of law and judgments of
courts and tribunals. The second is through the study of theories of law. The relation
between the two notions can be discerned in the legislation and legal process in
different legal systems, for instance the civil legal system and common law system
which are mostly the base of legal system in a vast number of countries. Those
systems differ between two classical theoretical schools: Positivism and Natural Law.
Legal positivism means the "social perspective of a legal rule's validity being
authorized by law and socially accepted versus being based on natural or moral law.
View of man-made law as posited by man for man, rather than being fair."3 In
contrast, the Natural law means "The foundation of this law is placed by the best
writers in the will of God, discovered by right reason, and aided by divine revelation;
and its principles, when applicable, apply with equal obligation to individuals and to
nations."4 In the late 19th and the beginning of the 20th century, a new revolutionary
movement began to take shape. This movement is known as Legal Realism.

B.

Legal Realism in Jurisprudence

To begin, legal realism has tackled many issues in the legal system, one of which is
the contractual relationship between the state and individuals as seen in courts. The
3

The Law Dictionary, What is LEGAL POSITIVISM? definition of LEGAL POSITIVISM (Black's Law
Dictionary), http://thelawdictionary.org/legal-positivism/, November 2015.
4
The Law Dictionary, What is NATURAL LAW? definition of NATURAL LAW (Black's Law Dictionary),
http://thelawdictionary.org/natural-law/, November 2015.
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debate of freedom of contract has influenced Realists. They attacked the vague
principle of laissez faire that was affecting the rationale of judges in many cases. A
survey of these scholarly writings is important because it will give the objective
overview of the theory to draw a new context of analysis for cases such as Omar
Effendi. Realism offers tools which aid the analysis of any legal system.
In terms of the theory of realism, most thinkers argue between two propositions. The
first is that Legal Realism failed due to the weaknesses in the basic premises of the
theory. Initially, judges and lawyers are the real creators of law, and not the legislators
who write it. Some Realists contend that judges do not make decisions based on
theory, but based on their own opinions, beliefs and desires which in turn are based on
economic, sociological and psychological factors. The second is to what extent
politics intervenes in law implementation. The fact is that economic and political
factors have played a major role in marginalizing the theory.
In terms of the economic and political factors, most scholars agree that politics
somehow intervenes in the law,5 but they disagree on the extent and location of
intervention.6 The law is an essential element in a society. Other factors such as
resources, land, administrations and wealth of a society are all elements which are
often under the supervision and sometimes rule of state governments. Law is related
to the life of every citizen in a society. It is a fact that law is not pure, and has always
been affected by different factors, but there ought to be an acknowledgment of the
political intervention in order to describe the actual process of execution of the law.
Consequently, this will drive us to a better understanding of law implementation and
application of any legal system in its own context.
There are at least five categories of publicists those who (1) believe that law is made
politically by a small group of people who control the legislation of the American
nation;7 (2) ought not to question how law is made but how law will be applied and
predicted;8 (3) believe that law is a means with various sociological, economic and
political elements designed for social ends;9 (4) define the law as a myth which must
5

See generally Neil Maccormick, The Concept of Law and 'The Concept of Law', 14 Oxford J. Legal
Stud.1-24 (1994).
6
Joseph William Singer, Legal Realism Now, 76 Cal. L. Rev.465 (1988).
7
Id. at 2.
8
See generally Id. Justice Oliver Wendell Holmes and John Dewey who agreed on that perspective.
9
Id. at 38. Roscoe Pound is the founder of the sociological jurisprudence.
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be capable of adapting to the changing social, industrial and political conditions;10 (5)
and believe that law is definitely politicized and it is better to discover how to benefit
from that position than debating the relationship between law and politics.11
The first three categories present the basic premises of the theory’s founding fathers.
Realism evolved in the beginning of the 20th century by uncovering the political and
economic factors which undermined legal theories’ application in practice.
Consequently, the real evolution of the theory is presented in the fifth category which
developed in the late 20th century by determining the reasons for failure and finding
alternatives. The political and economic factors became a fact which is a challenge for
Legal Realists.
Through historical analysis, Legal Realists in the past century have succeeded in
proving

their

point

through

case

law12

that

law

is

used

politically

sometimes/oftentimes to defend the laissez faire capitalist notion.13 Even though the
law was designed politically, the judges when they face a vague position in the law,
they favor a political notion over the other. On the other hand, the realists'
oppositionists have rejected the realist's insights on the law. They criticize the realist
movement and scholars in many ways. Their most offensive critique is that the realists
are considered as being critical Protestants rather than theorists, and Realists have
failed to introduce an alternative answers to controversial legal debates.14 In order to
clarify this debate, a study of legal realism origins follows.

C.

Realism Origins

Legal Realism arose out of the progressive movement of prominent scholars. It
challenged the formal schools by exposing the legal system’s biases, inconsistencies
and structural injustices. Realism’s aim was to study law from a different perspective
than the prevailing type of analysis; a change that could transform the entire legal
system. Legal practitioners kept using law as a political tool and each was
10

Neil Duxbury, The Theory and History of American Law and Politics, 13 Oxford J. Legal Stud. 262,
249-270 (1993). Jerome Frank is presented by Duxbury as a founder of Realist movement.
11

See generally Id.
See Id. at 250. Brown and Lochner are the most significant cases which made legal scholars rethink
the politicizing of law in a way which serves economical interests.
13
Bernie R. Burrus, American Legal Realism, 8 Howard L.J., 36-51 (1962).
14
See Id.
12
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manipulating law to serve a certain political interest. Lochner15 was the pivotal case
which questioned the purity of law in terms of a court own interpretation and
understanding of a law. It opened the door to tons of legal analysis which varied
between supporting and rejecting the court's decision.
Realists criticized the common law system on one of its chief features. The courts
judged based on precedent adjudications. By the late 19th century in the United States,
the number of precedents had become enormous.16 Unconsciously the judges had
adopted a different approach to avoid the effort of deciding based on precedents; they
adjudicated based on their own opinions and beliefs, essentially extra-legal elements,
and then selected the precedents that supported their views. Three theories were
formulated to explain this process; the first believe that precedents yield rules; the
second based on formalism believed that rules must be developed by systemizing
precedents and weeding out those which do not belong to the present social status; the
third by realists believed that desired decisions determine the selection of precedents.
While the process of desired decisions/ selected precedent was much easier for the
judges, it was not achieved by using the precedents (or codified laws as in the Civil
law systems); simply it was a pragmatic technique to find the desired outcome of one
precedent case and use it for reference while ignoring the different facts. This process
supports the realists' claim of the non-existence of the neutrality of law. From this
point forward, realists have based their own premises of a legal system, on the social
ideologies, opinions and beliefs of judges which affect the decision making process.
First Realists wanted to destroy the facade of judicial impartiality. Then they wanted
to explain the content, and predictability, of actual judicial decisions. Only then,
thirdly, did they look to the shared politics of the judiciary. The aim was both to
expose these politics and to shame the judges into abandoning them. A significant
topic that raised many realist debates was the contractual relationship and its extent of
laissez faire.
The principle of laissez-faire was the essential element that governed the contractual
relationship. Horwitz praised its value when stating that "it expressed, above all, the
post-Civil War triumph of laissez-faire principles in political economy," and for the
15

Lochner v New York 198 US 45 (1905).
Felix S. Cohen, Transcendental Nonsense and the Functional Approach, 35 Colum. L. Rev., 809-849
(1935), Footnote 52.
16
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view that "government is best which governs least."17 That position reflects the will of
parties, on other terms, as long as the state intervenes in governing the contractual
relationship, it deprives to an extent the freedom and will of contracting parties.

D.

What Realism Is

Although legal realism is a field of study, there is no proper definition of its meaning.
However, legal scholars have described it as a philosophical idea. Laura Kalman in
her book Legal Realism at Yale18 has defined Realism by stating that first, it is a form
of functionalism or instrumentalism. The original realists sought to understand legal
rules in terms of their social consequences.19 To better their understanding of how law
functions in the real world, they attempted to unify law and the social sciences. 20 They
believed that this knowledge would enable them to reform the legal system to achieve
efficiency and social justice.21 Second, the realists proclaimed the uselessness of both
legal rules and abstract concepts.22 Rules do not decide cases; they are merely
tentative classifications of decisions reached, for the most part, on other grounds.23
They are, therefore, of limited use in predicting judicial decisions.24 Thus, the realists
rebelled, to some extent, against Langdell's case method. They taught their students
that it was impossible to abstract general principles from cases and deduce specific
rules from those principles.25
Realists hoped to make judicial decision making more predictable by focusing on both
the specific facts of cases and social reality in general, rather than on legal doctrine.
They sought to organize judicial decisions around situations of different cases rather
than legal concepts.26 By paying close attention to facts and to conventions of social
institutions rather than abstract concepts, they hoped to discover what really animated
17

Henry David Thoreau, Civil Disobedience (1848).
Laura Kalman, Legal Realism at Yale: 1927-1960, Chapel Hill and London: University of North
Carolina Press, xii-314 (1986). This description of legal realists was an excerpt from Joseph William
Singer, Legal Realism Now, 76 Cal. L. Rev.465 (1988), it should be noted also that Singer is not
agreeing completely with this proposition over realism thinking. He introduced another story of Legal
Realism as Pragmatic Critique of Power.
19
Id. at 3.
20
Id. at 17-18.
21
Id. at 17-18, 31.
22
Id. at 3-4.
23
Id. at 5-7.
24
Id. at 4-5.
25
Laura Kalman, Legal Realism at Yale: 1927-1960, Chapel Hill and London: University of North
Carolina Press, xii-314 (1986), at 17.
26
Id. at 6, 29-30, 70.
18
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judicial decisions.27 By making connections between law and actual life experience,
they sought to make law less abstract and link it more closely to social reality. 28 They
believed that this would enable them both to predict judicial decisions more
accurately and to promote just social reforms.29 The realists believed that it was
impossible to generalize about judicial decisions from the perspective of legal rules
because every judge was different, and only "the personalities of judges" could
explain their decisions.30
The main dilemma that faced the realist thinkers was the right way to engage the
normative reasoning and application of law without referring to the applied formal
rules and laws, or even without being affected by the political interest group's
demands. Many scholars tended to use new means by combinating of classical and
realist arguments when trying to answer hard questions of law.31

E.

What Realists Thought

The methods of legal realists' thinking can be described as revolutionary relative to
the formal schools of jurisprudence. They introduced their review of legislation and
application of law in a 'real' world that involves many factors that affects the process
of law. The realists generally were atheist in the determinacy of legal rules. They
thought that there was no need for any generalization in making laws as it would be
meaningless; the judges' decisions are mainly overwhelmed by the psychological state
of the judge. The main elements in deciding cases are: the facts of the case, the
judges’ ideology, and the social context. The realists stated that studies of these
factors would lead to better predictability of decisions.32 The realists in fact turned the
case deciding methodology upside down. Rather than deducing general principles
from the case decisions, they used this tool to prove the incoherence of the law. 33 The
case analysis method is seen as a great weapon for the realists to prove the
inconsistency of law application. This inconsistent application of law refutes the
formalists' argument that case analysis is for demonstrating the general principles of
27

Id. at 33-34.
Id. at 70.
29
Id. at 8-9, 21, 131.
30
Id. at 164.
31
See Ronald Dworkin, Hard Cases, in TAKING RIGHTS SERIOUSLY 81, 82 (1977).
32
Karl Llewellyn, The Common Law Tradition: Deciding Appeals, at 19-61, 121-32,
178-219 (1960).
33
Joseph William Singer, Legal Realism Now, 76 Cal. L. Rev.465 (1988).
28
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law. However for realists, the fact is the case analysis shows that the application of
law is not more than an application of competing policy principles. The realists have
always claimed that the law includes competing provisions which are always valid for
a judge to choose to apply in a specific case, and to justify its position.

F.

Influence of Extra-Legal Factors

Law has always had a complicated relationship with extra-legal34 elements. Normally
the constitution defines, or even in many cases chooses between the competing
principles of policies and economics that govern the society in a state. Initially, an
understanding of law is essential to draw a picture of law's necessity. This necessity is
typically to achieve the constitution's objectives. One mainstream definition of Law is
“the principles and regulations established in a community by some authority and
applicable to its people, whether in the form of legislation or of custom and policies
recognized and enforced by judicial decisions.”35 Another definition sees the law as
"the system of rules which a particular country or community recognizes as regulating
the actions of its members and which it may enforce by the imposition of penalties."36
From those definitions we can draw a picture of the legal relationship between the
various elements of a society: citizen, state, economy and policies. The fact is that
policies change with changes in authority; consequently, the interpretation of legal
rules by courts has always reflected the interests of one political ideology over the
others due to the change of political authorities. This truism is clear in one of the
father’s of Realism, Gray’s well-known comments: “law of a great nation means the
opinion of a half-dozen old gentlemen.”37 The same point was made by Burrus
describing Gray’s view of law:38
The result was that, although Gray himself retained the
positivist penchant for an essentially logical process in
The reference of extra-legal elements in this context is made for the competing economic, political
and societal principles.
35
Law, Dictionnary.com, http://dictionary.reference.com/browse/law?s=t, May 2013.
36
Oxford Dictionaries, http://www.oxforddictionaries.com/definition/english/law, August 2015.
37
Bernie R. Burrus, American Legal Realism, 8 Howard L.J. 2, 36-51 (1962). Burrus has described
Gray as one of the mental fathers of Realism, he also presented the basic premises of Legal Realism by
quoting the significant contributions of those mental fathers. The reference made of half-dozen old
gentlemen is believed to refer to the majority of the nine justices of the Supreme Court of United
States.
34

38

See Id. at 37.
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deducting law from the sources indicated, his own definition as
well as his comments called attention to the significant
influence of personality, prejudice and other nonlogical[sic]
factors upon the making of the law.
Realists based their main criticism on legal classicism on the myth of the equation.
Judges practiced law as if they were solving an equation. According to Gilmore, he
criticizes the formal technicality of adjudication by stating that: 39
The truth or error, the rightness or wrongness, of a judicial
decision could be determined merely by checking to see
whether it fitted into the symmetrical structure; if it fitted, it
was right; if it did not fit, it was wrong and could, or at least
should be disregarded.
The equation according to the application of formalists is rules and facts
should always equal a conclusion. However, the myth of an equation might be
applied in sciences such as math and physics, but not to a complicated system
like law. The realists have claimed that political, social and economic factors
in a society intervene in the whole legal system from legislation to the
execution procedure; accordingly the question is now whether to accept or
fight against this concept.
The most prominent forefathers40 of Realism shaped the movement’s
premises. While Realists have disagreed on a number of the theory’s
fundamentals, the synthesis of their ideas shaped the basic premises. Initially,
judges and lawyers were seen as the real creators of law, and not the
legislators who first wrote it. They also agree that judges do not make
decisions based on theory, but based on their own opinions, beliefs and desires
which were based on economic, sociological and psychological factors
Therefore they hide behind the "transcendental nonsense"41 which they created
in the first place. Cohen deduced that the judges hide their decisions behind
transcendental nonsense since they could not justify their 'affected' decisions
without referring to nonsense justifications. Substantively, legal theories need
39

Grant Gilmore, Legal Realism: Its Causes and Cure, 70 Yale L.J. 1037, 1037-1048 (1961).
Reference is made here for Holmes, Karl Llwellyn, Felix Cohen and others.
41
Felix S. Cohen, Transcendental Nonsense and the Functional Approach, 35 Colum. L. Rev., 809-849
(1935). Cohen has stated in his article that every trial to find an exact definition or answer to legal
debatable questions is a transcendental effort. The transcendental nonsense is the way used by judges to
argue or reason their position in interpreting the law.
40
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to be evaluated for how they fit into the society they serve. Law is a means to
social ends, not an end in itself. It needs to be constantly examined and
evaluated for its purpose and its effect. The actors of such examination and
evaluation consist of different groups of interest in order to make sure that a
balance of interests is achieved. Realists' main proposition is that the value of
a case is in its outcome, and who won, and the use of that knowledge to
predict future cases. Also for the purpose of study we must separate ideas of is
and ought, and not allow our judgment to be contaminated by the way we wish
things to be, or how we think they ought to be. Realists’ premises drove the
notice of the intervention made between law and policies.

G.

Lochner v. New York

The most relevant example of political adjudication is illustrated in Lochner v
New York.42 The Supreme Court struck down a New York statute fixing a tenhour maximum work-day for bakers on the basis that it was against the
stipulation in the Fourteenth Amendment that “no State shall . . . deprive any
person of life, liberty, or property, without due process of law.”43 Justice
Peckham declared the statute unconstitutional because it interfered with an
individual’s general right of contracting. The constitution was deemed to
guarantee the individual’s liberty and freedom of contract unless
circumstances were at risk such as “the safety, health, morals and general
welfare of the public.”44 Otherwise, all other attempts at regulation by courts
of existing contracts would be considered “meddlesome interferences with the
rights of the individual.”45 This case presents the argument of realists that the
intervention of judges’ personal opinions and ideologies is present when
making decisions.
In this case, Justice Peckham clearly exploited the vagueness of the free will
principle in the Constitution to favor the economic policy of laissez-faire,
disregarding the safety and health of employees, and especially laborers.
42

Lochner v New York 198 US 45 (1905).
Neil Duxbury, The theory and History of American Law and Politics, 13 Oxford J. Legal Stud. 249,
249-270 (1993).
43

44
45

Id. at 249.
Id.
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According to that concept, a twenty-four-hour work day contract is considered
to be an enforceable contract. Justice Peckham neglected the possible negative
impact of that decision on the relations between employer and employees in
the event of more than ten hour daily work contracts, and their impact on the
safety and health of workers, the workplace and society. With this decision,
labor exploitation is legalized. An employer, as a supreme power in a labor
contract, has the right to decide any amount of working hours for the
employee. On the other side, the employee, in most cases, accepts these
conditions based on his/her need of money or a job.46

H.

Consequences of Lochner

Lochner raised many questions with respect to the jurisprudence of contractual
relationships. It also motivated scholars to uncover the reasons behind the
court's decision. Freedman concluded that the principles of free market shaped
the court's decision:
The institution of contract thus represented the legal expression
of free market principles, and every interference with the
contract system-such as regulation of the terms and conditions
of a labor contract-was treated as an attack on the very idea of
the market as a natural and neutral institution for distributing
awards.47
Justice Holmes, also known as the founder of Realism, concluded that “the
majority Justices has reached their decisions on the basis of an economic
theory which a large part of the country does not entertain.”48 Holmes insisted
that the constitution is not intended to embody a particular economic theory;
on the contrary, a constitution stands above matters of policy and is made by
people of fundamentally differing views. The concept of constitution
neutrality was considered a naive one. It is more appealing for those who
consider the Constitution as representing the various ideologies in a society, or
in its Platonic49 version, to stand in a neutral position apart from ideologies.
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Quarterly 38-3, 1923, 470-494 (472).
47
See L. Freedman, Contract Law in America 184-94 (Univ. of Wisconsin Press 1965)
48
Id. Supra note 19.
49
Reference is made here for the Utopian state of Plato, as a sort of non-existence of the Constitution
that stands neutrally between all citizens.
46

13

They believe that the moment when one ideology is favored over the others is
the moment when the Constitution is partial and loses its neutrality. For
realists, the fact remains that the choice of writing "this and not that" in a
constitution is a political choice. The constitution was and will never be
neutral. However, the constitution may be held neutral, for instance, when
considering economic policy.
Lochner occurred at the same time as the creation of the stratified conception
of a state, whereby the working class stake did not enjoy full constitutional
rights as the upper class did. Peckham’s decision was directly in favor of the
employers’ party in contract over the employees. With that notion, Peckham
distorted the constitutional concept of neutrality in favor of protection of
economic notion of laissez faire. It is contended that Justice Peckham
subconsciously believed that laissez faire was a neutral principle no matter the
facts or circumstances. Holmes believed that justices should “fairly be
expected to restrain themselves from importing into the Constitution their own
policy preferences.”50 Holmes also predicted that the Constitution would
appear to be politically partial, and that partiality would drive the working
class to lose respect and support for the Constitution. Horwitz agreed with this
proposition in noting the changed economic landscape:
Ironically, the constitutionalization of freedom of contract in
Lochner came after two decades of astonishing change in the
structure of the American economy that had resulted in the
creation of giant corporations capable of exercising enormously
disproportionate market power. Monopolization of the
economy now would provide a catalyst for Progressive
critiques of the traditional assumptions of relatively equal
bargaining power that had formed the foundation of legitimacy
for the freedom of contract doctrine within Classical Legal
Thought.51
To sum-up, Lochner illustrates the point that competing political ideologies
and principles actually exist in law. The Constitution also remained silent, and
sometimes vague, towards those principles to be applied. From that point
onwards, the courts have had the power to implement their political decisions
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by appealing to favored law, or even appealing to their own interpretation of a
vague principle in the constitution.

I.

Brown v Board of Education

The Brown v Board of Education case reflects the political accommodation
made by the court to achieve an acceptable outcome for the society. It shows
that the interpretation of legal texts can vary according to the political position
the court wants to possess at a certain period of time.
Duxbury illustrates the intervention of politics in adjudication in another
classical case; he supported Holmes' critique of impartiality of the
Constitution by stating that:52
The problem of politics in constitutional adjudication surfaced
again in the case of Brown v Board of Education. In Brown, the
Supreme Court held that racial segregation in public schools,
even where black schools are not demonstrably inferior to
white schools, denies black children the equal protection of the
laws guaranteed by section one of the Fourteenth Amendment.
By declaring state-supported discrimination against racial
minorities to be unconstitutional, the Court secured a victory
for simple justice. But it also produced a decision every bit as
political as that which it had reached in Lochner.
In this case, the Supreme Court used its authority in a political manner. The
Court used its power in favor of defeating racial discrimination. This
adjudication can be viewed from two perspectives. First, the intervention
between politics and law is not always unconstructive. The court privileged
the simple notion of justice and equity between citizens in the society. Racial
discrimination has been an ongoing issue in American history. Disregarding
the liberty of a group of people to organize public schools based on racial
discrimination, the Court chose equality and antidiscrimination policies over
the majority’s liberty. This case illustrates the same argument used by Realists
in Lochner. That is, the ideology of laissez-faire is not unlimited; basic rights
of individuals and society must be protected by the courts.
The Realists constantly questioned the intervention of law and politics. In
Duxbury’s article, he mentioned Lochner and Brown stating:53
52
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In both cases, the Court resorted to the Fourteenth Amendment
in order to validate as law particular policy preferences. In
Lochner, the Court demonstrated a preference for laissez-faire
as opposed to economic interventionism. In Brown, it exhibited
a preference for racial integration as opposed to segregation. In
both cases, the Court failed to heed Holmes's plea for judicial
restraint in matters of constitutional adjudication.
As this paper aims to prove the necessity of thinking realistically about legal
system, it should be noted that many scholars were offended by Realism.
Legal scholars argued about two points. The first is that Legal Realism has
failed due to the weakness in the basic premises formulated by the theory's
forefathers. Karl Llewllyn is known as one of the fathers of Realism; however,
his plea for realism was the best description of Realism's positive attributes.
He believed and defended the notion of realism, and refused to examine the
movement with the same tools that formal schools were examined with.
According to Karl Llewllyn’s description, he defended Realism as being a
collection of influential thinking rather than a theory:54
There is no school of realists. There is no likelihood that there
will be such a school. There is no group with an official or
accepted, or even with an emerging creed. There is no
abnegation of independent striking out. We hope that there may
never be. New recruits acquire tools and stimulus, not masters,
nor overmastering ideas. Old recruits diverge in interests from
each other. They are related, says Frank, only in their
negations, and in their skepticisms, and in their curiosity.
Llewellyn defended Realism on the basis of the enrichment that was due to the
range of thinking. He considered this disagreement as being the main positive
feature of their movement; consequently, this lead to the enlargement and
enrichment critical theory. Alongside Llewellyn, Realists began their
movement through criticizing the entire legal system, and agreeing on basic
premises and principles. Realists took a revolutionary approach to legal
thinking, reasoning and application. So rather than debating whether Realists
are a school or not, it was better to analyze their principles and premises to
reach the social end. The social end is a fair legal system which applies,
53
54
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relatively speaking, better equity. To sum up, Llwellyn was the prominent
scholar who gave Realism dynamism, difference, integrity and hope.
On a different position of Llwellyn, other scholars viewed that Realism is a
complete mess, for instance, Walter B. Kennedy highlighted Realists’ failure
in his article A Review of Legal Realism55 stating that “It may well be that
Realists, immersed in the ruthless pursuit of facts and the grim realities of life,
are too close to their favored philosophy to observe its defects in operation.”
Kennedy presented four critical failures of Realism:
(1) Lack of consistent application of the scientific approach in
its criticism of traditional law.
(2) Overemphasis upon fact-finding and consequent
submersion of principles and rules.
(3) Absence of skepticism regarding the hypothetical theories
of the social sciences.
(4) The creation of a new form of word magic and verbal
gymnastics. 56
Kennedy pointed out the critical and jurisprudential defects of Realism. These defects
were understandable given that realists were lacking in the administrative field. The
third criticism leveled by Kennedy was that they were either too unconsciously
"Marxist" or too unconsciously "social-scientist"; in any event, they often failed to
adequately engage the indeterminacy of the social, of justice, and of progress.
With mentioning the Realists lack of writings about administrative law, and according
to Neil Duxbury’s article The Theory and History of American Law and Politics,57
Realists did not present an alternative administrative vision of law. Realists were not
considered to be part of the administrative law framework. Duxbury pointed out that
“realist jurisprudence remained basically silent on the matter of precisely what
political and moral standards ought to guide administrative action. Realist
jurisprudence, that is, urged no basic standards of justice or procedural criteria for the
administrative agencies.”58 This defect has been an ongoing flaw in Realist
jurisprudence; however, it can be considered as a formality deficiency rather than an
objectivity deficiency. Realists did not aim for an alternative legal system; rather, they
55
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sought improvement in legal scholarship through uncovering of the flaws in legal
systems.

J.

Law as a Political Tool

To begin, those who wished for an alternative legal system driven by the Realist
movement were depressed. Realism rose as a critical way of thinking that constructs,
and not to demolish. The policies played a major role in the law practice area. The
legal process is a political act. Starting with legislating laws to their execution, the
legal process involves political factors and decision that are most appropriate for the
society. Varying from one democracy to another, law is a manifestation of the
political position that a group of people want to achieve. The main dilemma for using
law as a political tool is always the possibility that preferences will change with the
political climate. The court may appear to actively promote its own anti-progressive
social and economic policies.
The real challenge that faced new Realists was that they ought not to promote the
independence between politics and law. The close relationship between law and
politics is a social reality. The moment Realists imagine a disconnection between law
and politics is the moment they fall into detachment from reality. Realists wanted to
expose legal myths, one being the application of rules in a mechanical manner. Judges
are not machines; they are human beings. It is a fact that judges make decisions based
on beliefs and ideologies. What the judges should consider is that neutrality and
impartiality are beliefs and ideologies on their own. The constitution should protect
different types of ideologies in order for them to develop over time. Realists never
argued that law should be neutral or impartial; nor that adjudication should be
apolitical. Realists argued that partiality and politics were necessary, and should be
done consciously, openly, and by accommodating different views.
Realism evolved starting the beginning of the past century by discovering the political
and economic elements which deprive the challenging of legal theories to be applied
in practice. Consequently, the real evolution of the theory is presented in the late of
20th century by seeing the reasons for failure and finding the solutions for these
failures. The political and economic factors became a fact which draws the
progressive challenge to the Legal Realists. In that matter, Duxbury stated that
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“Between 1870 and 1960, it seems, there occurred in the United States not so much a
major legal transformation as a struggle between those who wished, in one way or
another, to politicize law and those who endeavoured to preserve the ideal of legal
neutrality.”59
Both ideas are transcendental. As law ought not to be politicized entirely, it cannot be
detached from politics utterly too. The dilemma here is not using law as political tool;
this is an undeniable reality. Detaching politics from law is pure fantasy as well. The
law is inevitably political, and any claim to neutrality or impartiality is at best a
charade, at worst a delusion. The idea that this thesis is trying to present is
acknowledging the political element in the due process of law, which in the Egyptian
context rejected in favor of the claim that law is totally equal and neutral. The law is
inevitably politicised; the question is whether to acknowledge and expose this fact, or
deny and disguise it.
Most realists did not see determinacy (and hence objectivity or impartiality) as
possible within the so-called formal structures of law. Consequently, the question of
its desirability was irrelevant. Some, however, sought determinacy out with the formal
structures of law in the social sciences, in economics, and other fields. They sought to
redefine law to incorporate that determinacy. Others did not see determinacy as an
issue, or a worthwhile goal. This is the case for Duxbury who portrayed the relation of
law and politics as being co-related:60
I shall argue that the move to politicize American law was not quite so
concerted or powerful as he would have us believe and that his own
conclusion-that we must recognize that law is ineluctably politicalmerely reiterates rather than casts fresh light on what, above, we have
termed the problem of law and politics.
The morality of concepts such as neutrality and impartiality versus partiality is the
same moral contradiction as poor and rich. Even in the fairest system in the world, all
people are not poor, or all people are rich. Differentiation is the main feature among
human beings. There will always be the richer and the poorer. The justification is not
what matters; the discrimination of people is a matter of fact in any society.
59
60

Id. at 254.
Id. at 255.

19

K.

Laissez-faire and Contractual Relationship

One major link between political concept and law is laissez-faire in the contractual
relationship. Laissez-faire was a liberal movement and a system of ethics, and in some
cases a claim about justice. Pound argued that the public right faced many threats:"
there was an individualist conception of justice, which exaggerates the importance of
contract [and] exaggerates private rights at the expense of public right."61 The
Utilitarian movement also that was very influential in the context of legal
implementation. Horwitz has described this movement by stating that:
As in many others areas of the law, late-nineteenth-century contract
jurisprudence had actually shifted away from the post-revolutionary
natural rights theories. Its increasingly utilitarian efforts to use law to
promote economic growth often sacrificed an individualized sense of
justice.62
Whether laissez-faire brings justice or not, that is not its aim; it is the role of law.
Laissez-faire is a notion that can be used by courts to favor one political position over
another as seen in Lochner, or controlling it by the courts if it brings racial
discrimination as seen in Board of Education.

L.

Conclusion

To conclude, Realism has in effect changed a lot of conceptions about legal
reasoning. It has brought out thinking about the legal system and its context in
society. The influence of Legal Realists was successful in terms of understanding the
market system and the laws affecting it, especially self regulating and fair markets.
We now understand that contracts are subject to coercive power exercised by the state
through its legislation and implementation in courts.
Realism never intended to be an alternative to nor contradictive to formalism in the
formal sense of the jurisprudential school; I believe that it naturally came after
formalism. It is one stage in the development of law, and culture. The intellectual
movement that was promoted by the Realists guided the reform of the American legal
system.
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I believe that a wide range of legal scholars who were exposed to Realist thoughts
accepted the message that we should not answer questions of law by summoning the
abstract concepts of contract, property and liberty. We are trying now to draw the line
between fairness and coercion, or to find fairness in coercion by locating coercion in
fair rules.63 In order to draw this line, we should be thinking about the policies,
intentions and purposes underlying legal rules. This line will also help move towards
a fair and efficient social end. Every legal thinking approach should depend on the
perception of competing policy interests. We attribute this approach to legal Realists;
they were the initial introducers of line-drawing, policy analysis, purpose by
reasoning and interest balance in the interpretation of court's decisions. The main aim
of this paper is to detach from the holistic element that has always been attached to
the Egyptian legal rules and courts' decisions. Every interpretation of a court's
judgment in Egypt was viewed as doubting a judges' integrity. The following chapters
prove that it is important to criticize those decisions for a better understanding of
judicial reasoning.
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III.

OMAR EFFENDI CASE (Fakharany Vs. Anwal Co.)64

In Omar Effendi case,65 the Egyptian State Council's Administrative court has
rendered null and void the purchase agreement of 90% of the stakes of Omar Effendi
Corporation between the National Company for Reconstruction and Development
owned by the State of Egypt on the one side, and the Anwal Company represented by
the businessman Jamil El-Kanbitt on the other side. The court also ruled the
arbitration clause of the agreement invalid. The state was able to recall all assets and
branches of the company free of any mortgages made by the purchaser. The
employees of the company were to maintain their positions including all their rights
from the moment of execution of the contract. The purchaser alone also should bore
all losses due to mismanagement, and bore all due taxes during the period of
execution of the agreement. The stipulation obliging the purchaser to sell 5% of
shares to the IFC was also rendered null and void.
The judgment was delivered by Justice Hamdy Yassin Okasha, Vice President of the
State Council. In the court's reasoning, the sale agreement was made by fault from
corrupted politicians who, in the decision reasoning, acted as the company was an
abomination of Satan that should get rid of at any cost. Those people in power dealt
with Omar Effendi, with all that it contains of thousands of workers, staff, real estates
and branches, in a neglecting way to its real value and importance to the state and
economy. This sale agreement was suspicious of conspiracy and corruption. The court
based its decision on a long and complex series of 24 administrative procedures and
conditions that should have met before concluding the agreement.
From my perspective, this decision raises a long set of inquiries. I propose in this
paper that this decision is actually an active political decision, same as Lochner and
Brown. The Omar Effendi judgment was rendered in the aftermath of January 2011
revolution. While the economy of Egypt was collapsing promptly, active political
judgments were considered as threats for investment prospects.
It is favorable from legal system to reconstruct more than to demolish. By this
decision, investors may have fears of investing in a non-stable political climate. Also I
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believe that the state misused its judiciary power to be in the supreme position in a
contractual relationship. Superficially, the court triumphed over corrupted political
decisions rendered before the revolution. However, it endangered the economical
status of the country disruptively. It ignored the basic concept of a contractual
relationship which is the will of parties. If the parties formerly anticipated the needed
procedures and conditions they could have fulfilled it. I believe that both parties, upon
the conclusion of the agreement, were convinced that they have satisfied those
conditions mentioned above. To connect between Omar Effendi and Lochner, it
should be noted that the same rational was used by the courts but in different context.
Both courts claim that they deduced the intention of the parties by discovering the
objective facts of each case, and disregarding the subjective facts of both. Clarence
Ashley supported that proposition regarding the courts intervention in contractual
relationship:
Where courts imply conditions in a contract, they 've igorously
disclaim any idea of changing the contracts of the parties and argue
that by interpretation they find the intent of the parties, As a matter of
Fact... in all these cases the courts have in reality made a new contract
for the parties.66
The purpose for choosing OE is that it clearly shows the preoccupations used by the
judge in a historical moment punctuated by political turmoil. This case highlights
several key issues in the Egyptian legal system -pre and post- the 25th January's
revolution.67 Some of these are corruption, privatization, foreign investments and the
contractual relationship between the state and investors. This chapter introduces the
facts, decisions and the court's reasoning and procedures of the OE. Its goal is to
demonstrate the case in an objective view and contextual framework.

A.

Historical Background of Omar Effendi Co.

The history of the Omar Effendi Company is a long one. The Omar Effendi Company
was established in 1856 in Cairo by the Orosdi family under the name of "Orosdi
Back". The Company was formulated as a department store and general wholesaler
66
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with branches. Its long history, merchandise and additional number of branches across
Egypt contributed to its iconic status in the Egyptian market. The first prominent shift
in the history of Omar Effendi was when it became one of the most popular chain
stores when it was bought by a Jewish Egyptian investor in 1921 and changed its
name to Omar Effendi. The second shift was when the company was nationalized
during the Gamal Abd El Nasser era along with many other foreign and Egyptian
owned companies in 1957. In 1967, Republican Decree No. 544 transformed Omar
Effendi into public Egyptian company, and affiliated it to the Holding Company of
Commerce. The Holding Company of Commerce was later dissolved and Omar
Effendi's ownership transferred to the National Company for Building and
Construction. The last and most significant shift in Omar Effendi's history was the
decision made by the Egyptian Government to privatize the company by selling the
majority of its stocks in November 2006. The company’s investment plans included
refurbishment and infrastructure upgrade of the Omar Effendi chain of retail
department stores.

B.

Political Context68

The political context of this case changed vastly from the government's decision to
nationalize OE in 1956 to the court's decision to annul the Company's shares sale
agreement. During the 1980s and 1990s, the Egyptian governments began a structural
adjustment program which involved privatizing publicly owned companies as part of
the principles of open market. The drafting of new laws and legislations were
designed to serve the aim of transitioning to a laissez faire state. For instance, the law
number 203 for the year 199169 governed the transition to privatizing public
companies. In accordance with the economic and political demands of this period, the
media began promoting the idea that public companies were a burden on the
economy. The leftists of this period rejected this claim by stating that this burden was
inaccurate, and misrepresented that the government made these claims in order to
lower the sale prices of enterprises and expedite the privatization process. They also
contended that the unavailability of accurate data and the lack of transparency about
the real market value of assets was an opportunity to lower the sale prices in order to
68
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promote their purchase by the private sector.70 Moreover, the governments also
blamed the public companies management's corruption and argued that the process of
privatization was the only means to end this corruption and reduce the economy's
deficit.
With the sale of Omar Effendi, it was believed that the government was eager to
privatize the company. It was the reason for its accepting low purchase price far
below the company's worth. At the same time, the official charges of corruption that
were raised after the sale agreement were dropped from the courts which increased
suspicions about the deal. During the period before the OE sale, the company suffered
from poor management.71 Opponents have suggested that this strategy was adopted by
the government to facilitate the privatization process. The OE Company was
ultimately privatized and sold to Anwal United Trading Company Limited in 2006.
Accordingly, Jameel El Kanbit became the new Chairman of OE, and in 2007 he
initiated new strategies to upgrade the chain of stores.72 The restructuring made by the
Chairman included changes of the image, its management and operations. The stores
also started to provide a variety of products that ranged from budget-friendly to
expensive products. Of the 82 stores, between 5 and 10 stores were selected to appeal
to the higher class of customers in the region. The rest of the stores continued the
company's main focus to provide good quality products at inexpensive price.
In 2011, the Egyptian State Council ruled that this privatization occurred in
contradiction to the law from both parties of the agreement; additionally, the buyer
violated its obligations stated in the agreement. Anwal had allegedly mismanaged the
company, unfairly fired employees and received unregistered assets. For these
reasons, the court annulled the administrative decision taken by the Egyptian
Government to sell Omar Effendi, and consequently the court held the agreement to
sell 90% of Omar Effendi's shares to Anwal null and void.

C.

Fakharany vs. Anwal's Facts
1.

Timeline
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The timeline of the case starts from the government's decision of selling the shares of
the company, and ends by the annulment of the sale agreement. On 1st of January
2001, the Ministerial Committee for Privatization approved the privatization of the
company. The committee issued a decree for the sale of some public companies
including Omar Effendi to a sole investor, and based on three conditions. The first
was that to exclude assets, freehold lands and losing branches by transferring its
ownership to the National Company for Building and Construction. The second was
to sell the company without the freehold of the lands, based on leasing these lands to
the buyer with long-term renewable contracts (35 years). The last was to evaluate the
company based on real market value then demonstrate this value in the Company's
General Assembly and the Ministerial Committee for Privatization to take the
decision of sale.
On the 6th of January 2004, the Ministerial Cabinet approved the sale of some public
companies including Omar Effendi.
On the 5th of March 2006, Yehia Hussein Abd El Hady raised a notice to the Public
Prosecutor claiming distrust in the procedures of sale of Omar Effendi. The Cairo's
Court of Appeal excluded the accusation of dissipation of public wealth; although, the
court proposed several considerations which the Holding Company should respect
before concluding the sale. These considerations were taking needed guarantees and
warranties from the buyer including: to keep the continuity of the activity, to remain
the employees and preserve their rights, to keep the Commercial Name, to keep the
fixed assets, and the final sale contract should set the appropriate penalty that should
be held on the buyer in case of non respect of these obligations.73
The company by that time consisted of 82 branches and 68 warehouses that were
valued by EGP 4 billion.74 The Government thought that this value might be a burden
in the privatization process, so it excluded some buildings that have historical
significance then evaluated the company based on its market value.
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Following an international bidding- by closed envelops-75 to sell Omar Effendi, as
one offer was submitted. Hence, the deal was awarded to Anwal Company. 76 On the
25th of September 2006, the privatization was processed. Omar Effendi's ExtraOrdinary General Assembly decided to sell 90% of the Company's shares for EGP
589,410,000.77 The Assembly decided also to maintain the ownership of 10% of the
company's shares in the possession of National Company for Building and
Construction to supervise the good will of the buying investor, and accordingly in the
future to distribute this stake on the company's employees when upon the
improvement of their financial status.78
On the 2nd of November 2006, the National Company for Building and Construction79
concluded a final sale agreement with Anwal Company related to 90% of Omar
Effendi's shares. In 2008, Anwal Company filed an arbitration case before the Cairo
Regional Center for International Commercial Arbitration80 claiming that NCBC
failed to comply with its contractual obligations, and thus requested to annul the sale
agreement. On the 10th of November 2010, the arbitral tribunal rejected the plaintiff's
claims and the annulment of the sale agreement in its award No. 583 for 2008. 81 The
details of the award will be presented in the next chapter for the purpose of critique.
On the 21st of December 2010, Hamdy El Fakharany as claimant,82 Aly El Seidi,
Mohamed Labib and Aly El Bassiouny altogether as interfering claimants sued the
Prime Minister, Investment Minister, NCBC Chairman, Anwal Chairman, Gamil El
Kanbit and others before the administrative court. The claimants requested the court
to annul the administrative order issued by the government to sell 90% of Omar
75
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Effendi Company's shares to Anwal, consequently terminate the sale agreement and
cease all its effects.83
2.

The Claims

The claims presented to the court by the claimants included the breaches made by
Anwal company towards its contractual relationship with the other party of the
agreement. The claimants alleged that Anwal violated its contractual obligations by
forcing employees to obey early retirement plans, discharging more than 600
employees, mismanaging the company, which lead to massive losses, undermined the
financial status of the company by mortgaging assets and selling 5% of the company's
shares to International Finance Corporation as credit facilities, and seizing
unregistered property, as it was stated that several pieces of real estate property were
not included in the sale agreement even though the buyer had acquired them.84
The first claim was based on the buyer's discharging more than 600 employees, which
was against its contractual obligations. The agreement stipulated that the buying party
could discharge 600 employees as a maximum number within three years from the
date of the agreement, and that the discharged employee was entitled to an indemnity
of an amount equal to the last three months' salary multiplied by the years of
service.85
Relating to the mismanagement of the company, the buyer was obliged by the
agreement to increase the public benefit of the company by activating its branches and
improving the sale of products and profit, leading to improving the profit for the
government from the company's taxes due and the dividends entitled to the 10% stake
of NCBC. Conversely, the buyer requested EGP 130 Million from the Government as
its share from the company's losses.86
Regarding the buyer's acquisition of unregistered assets, the claimants alleged that
Anwal seized real estate properties that were not included in the tender offer
conditions, and were never evaluated in terms of setting the sale price. The buyer also
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received assets that were valued as leased properties while their real value was freely
as properties.87
To sum up, the claimants demanded termination of the sale agreement relating to 90%
of Omar Effendi's shares, along with ceasing its operations. Additionally they
demanded the annulling of the sale's decision issued by the government based on
corrupt acts committed by persons in the Government to facilitate the privatization of
Omar Effendi, and charge its perpetrators for dispersing the public wealth.
3.

State Council's Decision

The Supreme Administrative Court88 decision challenged legal norms. It held its
hearing sessions during February and March 2011. Accordingly, the court issued its
final judgment on the 7th of May 2011, annulling the administrative order of the
Government to sell Omar Effendi, along with all its effects. Consequently, it included
ceasing and terminating the sale agreement related to selling 90% of Omar Effendi's
shares to Anwal Co. and Gamil El Kanbit, invalidating the arbitration clause included
in the agreement, and restoring the contractor's status to prior concluding the
agreement. Therefore, the state redeemed its possession of the company's assets and
branches free from mortgages that were concluded between Anwal and the banks. In
addition, the company is obliged to re-employ the discharged employees during the
execution of the agreement until the judgment to their positions along with settling all
their duties and rights. Finally, the buyer should bear all debts and dues that incurred
within the execution of the agreement, including the sale of 5% of the shares to IFC
along with its effects.89
4.

State Council's Reasoning

The reasoning of the court set a precedent for subsequent cases. The court reasoned
based on various considerations. Below is a brief survey of these considerations
respectively: the administrative court's justification for accepting the lawsuit, the
assertion of the administrative court's competence to settle the dispute, and the parties'
violations of necessary legal procedures before contracting, leading to violations of
87
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the contractual obligations by the buyer. The sum of these factors was the basis for the
withdrawal of the Government's initial decision to sell 90% of Omar Effendi's shares
to Anwal.
5.

Dispute of Competency

The first question any court asks at any case is its competency to accept the case. The
primary claimant, Hamdy El Fakharany, acted as a defender of the public rights and
wealth that were violated by the sale agreement.90 For such reason, El Fakharany
challenged the administrative decision to privatize Omar Effendi that was, in his
rationalization, an assault on the public wealth. According to the Egyptian
Constitution,91 Article 33 stated that, public wealth had sanctity, and the citizen
should bear the duty of its protection and support according to the law.92
Following the competence of the Administrative court,93 the court maintained its
competence over the dispute reasoning that defining the competence of the court is a
discretionary power that must be ruled solely by the court. A public order gives this
power to the court.94 The court also considered that the Ministerial Commission for
Economic Policies was a body affiliated to the Government; hence, all its decisions
were considered to be administrative decisions. During the hearings, the counter
argument was that the sale's agreement was a commercial agreement; thus the dispute
resulting from such an agreement should be settled by civil courts. However, the court
decided not to interfere in this debate by illustrating that it was settling a dispute
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arising from an administrative decision, and not the agreement itself. In order to
strengthen its position, the court highlighted its competency to settle the dispute.95
The defendants presented arguments contending that the decision to sell Omar Effendi
was a commercial decision, which was taken by a governmental entity to affect the
commercial position of a company. Based on this point, the administrative decision
ended the day the government designated the National Company for Building and
Construction to handle the privatization process. Therefore, all transactions that
conducted after this delegation were considered as commercial business dealings
between companies, which alternatively are subjects of Private Law.
However, the court chose to favor the position of the claimants and pursue an
administrative decision, even though commercial factors were present. In addition, the
court asserted that when the Government delegated the Holding Company to handle
the privatization, it was not for the purpose of its enrichment, and the returns from the
sale would not be credited to its account. On the contrary, the returns of the sale of
Omar Effendi had been credited to the account of the Egyptian Government in its
Central Bank, into an account titled "the return of sale of assets owned by the state."96
As a result, the Government was the real actor in the sales transaction, and not the
Holding Company.
Another counter argument presented was that the agreement included an arbitration
clause. According to the Egyptian law of Civil and Commercial Arbitration no. 27 for
the year 1994, article 23:
the arbitration clause should be considered as separate agreement from
other clauses included in the agreement; consequently the termination,
annulment or voidance of an agreement should not affect the separate
arbitration clause provided that such clause is proper. 97
The court justified its refusal of this proposition based on the sale contract's being
considered as an administrative contract, requiring approval from a competent
minister. In this case, such approval was not provided. The court considered the sale
95
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agreement as an administrative contract based on its previous assertion that the
government was a contractual party. Hence, the administrative court maintained its
competence over the contract, and had the power to disregard the exclusivity of the
arbitration agreement. In addition, whereas the agreement was considered to be an
administrative contract, the legislator required the competent minister approval of the
arbitration clause to deem it proper.98 Without it, the arbitration clause would be
deemed null and void.
6.

Dispute of Violations Committed by Both Parties

Following the court's declaration of its competency over the matter of the dispute, it
reasoned its judgment based on grounds of violations that were committed by both
parties before and during contracting. Some of these violations were violations of law
and procedures; others were violations of contractual obligations.
The court highlighted the violations committed by both contractual parties during the
sale process. The auction of 90% of Omar Effendi's shares contravened the law.99
Since there was a single offer submitted to the auction, the auction should have been
reestablished. According to the law, in case a single offer is submitted to an auction to
sell state's assets, the approval of a competent authority was required. Thus, the court
declared that the auction should have been annulled; consequently, all the effects
resulting from that auction should have also been annulled, including the sale
agreement.100
In addition to that the auction was not convened properly. The reestablishment of the
auction was the selling party's duty. However, the Government refused to rebid the
sale of Omar Effendi, even though the price offered by the buyer was much less than
the sale price of the tender. Such a refusal raised suspicions relating to the precontractual agreement between the investor and the seller. The court stated that the
government should have reestablished the auction since the price offered for buying
Omar Effendi's shares was much less than the real value of Omar Effendi's assets.101
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Another violation of law related to the tender offer brochure. The court acknowledged
that the brochure excluded major assets and real estate properties, which affected the
sale price negatively. However, the execution of the agreement lead to the investor's
receipt of these assets and properties. This raised doubts to whether a proper due
diligence was ever conducted on Omar Effendi's assets to evaluate the sale price, or
whether it was made intentionally by the selling party to decrease the price and hence
to pass the privatization process.102
The court highlighted in a significant portion of its judgment that the company was
wrongfully valued, which negatively affected the sale price. However, the court never
investigated the perpetration of such an act; consequently, the decision did not include
the civil or criminal liability that should have been pursued for these violations. For
instance, the sale price was set at nearly EGP 590 million; however, the main branch
is valued for EGP 700 million, and many other branches constituted on lands that
were valued at nearly EGP 4 billion. The proof of such was that the investor managed
to get loans for a sum of EGP 462 million in return for the mortgaging of only 16
branches of the 82 total branches controlled by the company. Also the company's
machines and tools were valued according to their net book value, without
considering their condition.103 The claim was made that the tools and machines were
valued at lower than their real value.
Moreover, the auction brochure -which included the company's assets offered to sellincluded branches which should have been excluded from being sold based on the
Privatization Ministerial Committee's decision. Additionally, according to the sale
agreement, the investor gained rights to sell 30% of Omar Effendi's assets to third
parties after offering them to NCBC according to their real market value. That meant
that the investor had the right to sell the Company's property and branches to third
parties, which contradicted the law.104
Regarding the contractual obligations, the court asserted that the buyer violated its
obligation to improve and develop the company. The court presented a series of facts,
which it considered as being violations of contractual obligations. Such facts included
the change of Omar Effendi's commercial name. The other main violation was the
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failure to properly finance the company, which was seen in the loans granted to the
investor through mortgaging of the company's branches to the advantage of the Ahli
United Bank, the Audi Bank and the IFC. These loans were EGP 462 million in total,
which was very close to the sale price itself. Such a sum was considered a huge drag
on the financial status of the company transforming it from being successful company
to a losing one. Also the decrease in the sales profit was seen as a violation of the
investor's commitment to developing the company.
Finally, the agreement stated that the buyer could not terminate the employment
contracts of more than 1,200 employees through offering early retirement, and to 600
employees during the three years following the conclusion of the sale agreement.
Such obligation was violated by the investor, who by 30th of June 2009 had
terminated the employment contracts of 2,433 employees. Further, the investor sold
5% of Omar Effendi's shares and mortgaged six branches to the IFC in return for
credit of USD 30 million, without giving any notice to the NCBC which had acquired
10% of the Company's shares. All of these facts constituted the basis of reasoning for
the annulment of the sale agreement that was rendered by the court.
7.

Conclusion

To sum up, as stated in the beginning of this chapter, the privatization process of
Omar Effendi involved many irregularities and corrupt actions during the sale of
Omar Effendi, along with the general breach of contractual obligations by the buying
party. What is clear from the court's decision is that the judgment only affected the
investor transferred losses and obligation to third parties. Superficially, the court acted
as a defender of public wealth, and an organ of the Government political authorities.
The upcoming chapter will discuss such a claim and discuss whether the courts should
or should not play such a role, which has significant political and economic
consequences on Egypt.
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IV.

REALIST CRITIQUE OF OMAR EFFENDI CASE

This chapter is dedicated to showing how the court in Omar Effendi had other options
and rules of law that might have been applied in the case; however, the court chose
the most favorable legal rules to achieve a certain end. I argue in this chapter that the
court preferred to take a shortcut to reach the desired outcome. Setting the legal rules
aside, the judges had pre-determined goal of ending the sale contract of Omar Effendi
in any possible way. I believe that the State Council judges105 cannot claim that they
did not know the legal rules that should have been applied in that case. My main
claim is that the judges disregarded the applicable legal rules in favor of other and
more inconvenient legal rules to protect their interests, and those of the state general
public.106 In placing this decision in its historical and societal contexts, it will be
revealed that the judges defended the political good. The judges were realistic even if
they claimed they were not. The court in the OE decision claimed that it used a
formalist methodology in deciding the case; however, the coming arguments will
prove that really appealing to the formalist methodology would have produced a
different decision in the case. We must acknowledge that what happened in OE case
is legal realism in its proper sense. My aim for this chapter is to prove such claim, and
to propose that recognizing legal realism produces better outcomes for Egypt
especially in the present time.
The State Council Court formulated the law in claiming that the contract has an
administrative nature, and disregarding the fact that it is a commercial contract which
is subject to ordinary civil courts. Commercial contracts are deemed in most legal
systems as a private law matter. However, in a case where the state gets involved in
commercial transactions, the question of the separation of powers comes into play.
When the state uses its judicial organ to favor the state party in a transaction, the
alarm regarding the fairness and justice in a legal system is triggered. Moreover, it
endangers the economic status of the state, the integrity of judges and affects the
society. The limitation that should be made by a state to respect this fairness will take
the form as a question as to which extent the state should be acting in contracts.
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Whether the state should be regulating the market or not, the market will remain a
combination of public laws and rules and private commercial transactions. Also in
this area we will be opposing to the question of coercion exercised by a state for the
distribution of power. The answer of the previous questions cannot in any way be
answered without reverting to the morality and policies adopted by the state in a
certain historical and societal context. Any trial to answer these questions by general
and vague principles and rules of law will be "transcendental nonsense". 107 This
chapter will be divided to three parts, to be accurate, to three different routes which
the court should have taken.

A.

Legal Fallacies in Omar Effendi Judgment
1.

Being Realistic to the Omar Effendi Judgment

The court's decision in the OE case contradicts the applicable laws in Egypt. Most of
the reasoning was illogical, illegal and full of legal fallacies. The political ideology
and context of this period in the Egyptian society clearly affected the court's decision.
The State Council Court accepted the case despite the fact it was not competent; it
reopened the case despite the fact that a previous arbitration award had been rendered
on the same subject and directed at the same parties; and finally, it produced a
judgment that contradicts existing laws.
In deciding this case, the court had three options. First, the court should have rejected
the case based on the fact that as an administrative court, it was not competent to
review commercial contracts. Second, the court could have refused to review the case
based on the fact that a previous arbitral award had been rendered on the case. Third
and finally, the court should have ended the sale contract based on the fact that the
seller breached its obligations, while bearing in mind appropriate indemnification for
both parties, together with the new parties involved.
2.

Competency of State Council Court (Administrative Court)

The first realist critique on the court's decision is that the court chose to accept the
case disregarding the matter of competency. The ordinary court is the competent
entity to review the sale contract of Omar Effendi, not the administrative court. There
are many legal rules that support this point as stated namely in the Judicial Authority
107
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Law, Notary Public Law, State Council Law and supported by Court of Cassation and
Constitutional Court decisions. As stated in article 15 of the Judicial Authority Law
"ordinary courts have the jurisdiction to settle all the disputes except for the
administrative disputes, which in turn should be settled by the State Council." 108 The
reference made for all disputes is for instance civil, commercial or criminal disputes.
Thus, administrative disputes should be settled by the administrative courts which are
supervised by the State Council. The same law states also that "ordinary courts are
competent to settle all disputes that might arise in relation to the ownership of mobile
or immobile assets." Thus, it is stated principle that all civil and commercial disputes
are under the jurisdiction of the ordinary courts.
The Cassation Court also stated that "the ordinary courts are competent to settle the
disputes that arise in relation to financial rights as mobile or immobile assets."109
Deducing from these points, law and jurisprudence confirm the principle that ordinary
courts are competent to settle disputes of a civil and commercial nature.
On the other hand, the law identifies State Council as competent to settle disputes that
arise from administrative contracts. The State Council law110 states that "the State
Council is competent to settle disputes that arise from contracts that are related to
managing public utilities, providing the government with products, and any other
administrative contract." The administrative court itself denied its jurisdiction over
contracts without an administrative nature:"the administrative court will not be
competent to settle disputes over contracts unless the contract is an administrative
contract."111 Furthermore, the administrative court also states that "the state Council is
not competent to settle disputes that arise from ownership law, as the ownership is
subject of private law that is governed by ordinary courts."112 In conclusion, the law
has assigned the competency of settling disputes that arise from a civil and
commercial nature to the ordinary courts, and the administrative courts have affirmed
this position by denying its competence to settle such disputes.
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In a matter of fact, the sale contract of Omar Effendi is considered to be a commercial
contract concluded between the Egyptian Joint Stock Company and the Anwal
Company. Accordingly, the only judicial entity that has jurisdiction to settle any
dispute that arises from that contract is limited to the ordinary court.
The State Council claimed its jurisdiction over the dispute of the sale of Omar Effendi
contract on the basis that the sale contract is an administrative contract. In
contradiction, the Supreme Administrative Court formerly stated that "the
administrative contract is the contract concluded between a governmental authority
and any other party in order to manage a public utility."113 The Egyptian
jurisprudence114 has established that a public utility is "every project established or
administered by the state, and works regularly and continuously, and is assisted by the
administrative authorities in its establishment or management in order to provide the
community with its basic needs, not for the profit, but for assisting the public order
and serve the general interests of the public in the state."115 In another case before the
State Council, it was stated that "even though one of the parties in the contract
referred to in the case is a person of the public law, yet the clauses of the contract
does not have the characteristics of administrative contracts, it can only be considered
as sale contract for assets owned by the state, also it was concluded in terms of the
private law, and does not propose the administration's intention to adopt the public
law elements."116 To that end, the State Council explicitly identified a main element in
the administrative contract which is "an administrative contract concluded for
managing public utility should include concession and privilege terms in favor of the
government."117
To sum up, the State council's reasoning to consider the sale contract of Omar Effendi
as being an administrative contract contradicts the law and the same court's reasoning
in preceding cases. A contract can only be considered administrative when the
government is a party in the contract, the management of a public utility is the subject
of the contract, and it includes exceptional terms and privileges in favor of the
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government entity that are defined in the public law. Accordingly neither of these
elements was included in the sale contract of Omar Effendi. The sale contract is
simply considered a commercial contract of a sale of shares between two joint stock
companies that are persons of private law.
3.

Arbitration Clause

As a matter of fact, Egyptian law recognizes arbitration as a dispute settlement
mechanism. In addition, the law prohibits resettling any dispute that has been
previously awarded by an arbitral decision. Article 55 of the Egyptian Arbitration law
no. 27 for 1994 has stipulated that "the arbitrators" awards that were awarded in
accordance with this law acquire the res judicata authority, and shall be forcibly
executed without prejudice to the provisions of the law." Hence, any trial to resettle a
dispute through litigation after being settled by arbitration is restrictive, and
contradicts the applicable law. That point was confirmed in jurisprudence. The Court
of Cassation's decision no. 521 for the judicial year 42 in a hearing on 15th February
1978 confirmed that "it is illegal to deliberate either effect or recognition of an arbitral
award even though it has not been enforced."
The State Council in its decision of the OE case assumed that the arbitration clause is
null and void as it concerns the sale agreement. The Article 20 of the OE sale
agreement states that:
all the disputes that may arise from this agreement shall be settled by
arbitration; the governing law shall be the Egyptian Arbitration Law;
the language of arbitration shall be in Arabic. The arbitration shall be
held in Cairo; the tribunal shall be formed of three arbitrators who shall
be appointed in accordance with the Egyptian Arbitration law. The
seller shall be liable for issuing all the approvals and permits necessary
in relation to the enforcement of the arbitration clause according to the
applicable provisions of the Egyptian laws.
On the 10th of June 2008, the parties in the OE case agreed to settle their dispute over
the sale agreement of OE through the arbitration in accordance with the arbitration
agreement which was included in the agreement. In a transformative event, the seller
found out that the company was not making the estimated profit they had envisioned.
This is in spite of the fact that the buyer had decided to mortgage some assets in
favour of loans and facilities for the sake of gaining working capital. Also the buyer
found that the seller was not performing its contractual obligations, including bearing
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its share of debt and taxes. Consequently, in a trial to annul the sale agreement and
obligate the seller to fulfil its obligations, Anwal Company filed an arbitration case
before the arbitration tribunal of the CRCICA,118 demanding the annulment of the sale
agreement of OE shares based on the errors made by the seller. On the 10th of
November 2010, the tribunal issued an award rejecting the request of the buyer to
annul the sale agreement.
To sum up, the arbitral award rendered by the arbitration tribunal was final and
executable, which means that it is not legal to seek a decision from another dispute
settlement mechanism or through litigation. The State Council should have refused
the case, or at least, declare its incompetency to resettle the case since a final
arbitration award was rendered for the same dispute and for the same parties. The
State Council did not have the authority either to review the case, or to annul the sale
agreement, as a previous award had been made to rejecting this demand before the
arbitral tribunal.
Moreover, article 22 of the Egyptian Arbitration Law stipulates that "the arbitral
tribunal has the power to solve matters which relates to its competence, the absence of
arbitral clause, its nullity or expiry, or its lack of subject of the dispute." To that end,
the State Council had no right to claim its competence over the dispute, or to claim
the nullity or validity of the arbitration clause. Article 23 of the same law confirms
this position by stipulating that" the arbitration clause is deemed an independent
agreement of the other clauses of a contract, and the nullity, expiry or termination of
the contract shall have no effect on the arbitration clause provided that the arbitration
clause is legitimate by itself." To reaffirm, the sole competency in the matter related
to the arbitration clause must remain in the authority of the arbitrators only, and not in
any other court. This law recognizes the seperability of the arbitration clause from the
other terms of the contract. This means that the invalidity, expiry, termination or any
other matter that affects the contract has no effect on the arbitration clause itself.
Finally, the State Council's decision in the OE case to consider the arbitration clause
as null and void along with the sale agreement is an illegal claim.
4.
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The State Council court in this case was an active party. It did not respect the basic
rule of neutrality between the parties of the dispute. The court also positioned itself as
a defender of public wealth, even though it was not public wealth in the first place. As
it was presented earlier, the seller in the OE case is a private entity who sold private
shares to another private entity. The intervention made by the court to favor one
party's right over the other is a clear policy intervention.
The reference to policy in this case can be regarded as the "need". The contract in the
first place was concluded on the basis of the seller's need to get rid of a wealthy
company that it could not properly manage. Consequently, in a period of time in
which the policymakers encouraged its privatization, the Holding Company for
Construction and Development sensed that getting rid of OE and selling it to a foreign
investor was easier than restructuring the company.
Joseph Singer in his article119 has described the realists' view about the need in
contract and courts' intrusion in freedom of contract by stating that:
The realists also criticized the internal coherence of the concept of
freedom of
contract by arguing that it was too abstract to generate specific
conclusions of
law. Freedom of contract necessarily includes the
freedom not to contract, which
requires courts to distinguish between
contracts that were voluntarily entered into and contracts obtained through
the coercive imposition of power by one party on others...Defining
what
constituted a free contract, then, required judges to make value judgments
about where to draw the line between freedom and necessity.
In the OE case, the State Council's judges felt the necessity to make a value judgment
to terminate the sale agreement. They also felt that the agreement was made during a
period of necessity and though coercion, and during the period of the case's decision,
the necessity transformed into annulling of the agreement for a better end in their
perspective.
Furthermore, in a period of time where high level of corruption existed, and a lack of
public transparency and surveillance, cover for the sale contract to be concluded at a
non fair price was provided. In the post-revolution period, the need has changed. The
State Council sensed that it must play the role of public wealth protector, and claimed
that it had the power to do so. By manipulating and misusing the legal rules, it
119
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succeeded in annulling the sale agreement. Nevertheless in an objective review of the
case, while the dispute was not resolved legally, it was resolved politically and
morally. Joseph Singer supported this view by showing that the realists concluded that
contracts reviewed in courts certainly give the courts the authority to make moral and
policy decisions in relation to the distribution and use of power in the commercial
market. 120

B.

Conclusion

What the judges did in resolving the OE case should not be regarded as an execution
of legal rules, but rather it was a creation of rules. They should think about the law
with an understanding of the contemporary social context. They also should not make
value decisions in the abstract, but rather examine the consequences of those
decisions on those who are affected directly and indirectly in the future. A good
understanding of the social context allows judges make decisions with satisfactory
practical results.
The law is not mechanical, and not a mathematical 'since and thus'; the decision in the
OE case is proof that the judges preferred the social consequence rather than the rigid
applicability of legal rules. The judges responded to the changing values and
circumstances of the changing political climate in Egypt by applying their moral
decision to the case. And thus, it is the time to acknowledge that as a fact, judges
superimpose their social and political values on legal cases.
For almost all legal actors and scholars in Egypt, the critical view is tough to
understand, or to be taken seriously. They think it is meaningless to challenge a
court's decision without giving the "right" answer. However, critical thinking is a way
of thinking rather than a way of finding an answer. There is no such thing as a "right"
answer. There will always be the better fitting answer in social and political context
for each case individually. The continuous denial of the interference of politics in
courts' judgments makes it easier for power-holders to implement their own political
vision. The policy made in courts is and intended by the legislature is justified, and
legitimizes the "right" way in the decision-making process.
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V.

FINAL CONCLUSION

To conclude, the aim of this thesis was never meant to be biased in favor of the
investor, state or employees. This thesis presents new tools for the review of cases
that include political aspects, especially contractual relationships between the state
and Private entities. The thesis also claims that law implementation, application and
execution has been and always will be attached to politics. The debate here is to
acknowledge this claim regarding the state, along with its powerful organ the courts.
The recognition of this state of affairs will lead to an improved review on the
consequences of the implementation and application of the law. It will also lead to
better anticipation of the court's decisions for lawyers and public individuals.
One alternative solution to this political case should have included independent
technical and economic experts' commission to investigate and report on their
findings. I believe that the court's decision was based on political reasons hidden
behind legal reasoning, which is the practice favored by judges and lawyers. The most
profitable solution for such a case, which affects the many parties involved directly or
indirectly, should have been answered independently by experts, economists,
investors and public individuals.
To develop our legal thinking as scholars, we should evade responding to
controversial cases by appealing to the shared legal rules and neutral proceedings. If
not, this will bring us back to assuming that everyone will arrive at the "right"
answers if they think in the "right" way, and ignoring ideological and political
considerations. Hence, the disagreement will be the wrong way of thinking, and not
the ideological and political dispute.
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